



Electoral violence, democratization, and election management

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Structure

I. Theoretical debate: idealists vs realists

- Problem: What causes electoral violence?
- Debate among idealists and realists

II. Concepts, evidence and research

- NELDA dataset (Hyde-Marinov)
- Measure electoral riots and violence
- Classify elections in developing nations 1960-2006

III. Analysis and results

IV. Conclusions and policy implications

Context: challenges of peace-keeping

- Expansion in peace-keeping operations but with checkered record of success
 - Success: Mozambique, El Salvador, Croatia
 - Problems: Sudan, Somalia, DRC
 - Pandora's Box: Of the 39 outbreaks of armed conflict in the last decade; 31 were recurrences (Hewitt et al)
- Electoral violence major challenge
 - E.g. Nigeria, Gabon, Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire,
 - Especially in transition from autocracy and the early process of democratization
 - Range of activities from occasional acts of violent intimidation or protest to outright renewal of civil war

Idealist theories: electoral democracy

- Divided societies emerging from civil conflict should hold elections at an early stage in any peace-building process. Why?
- Benefits for peace:
 - i. **Legitimacy:** Regimes derive authority from credible elections meeting international standards
 - ii. **Grievance:** Democracies provide peaceful channels for expression of discontent (Collier)
 - iii. **Human rights:** Reduce state repression (Davenport)
 - iv. **Practical option:** 'Democracy deferred is democracy denied' (Carothers)
 - v. **Indirect benefits for international peace** among democratic states (Russett)

Realist theories: State-building first

- Divided societies emerging from civil conflict should defer elections until after state-building. Why?
- Benefits for peace:
 - i. **Security first:** Transitions from autocracy destabilize and weaken the state; urgent need to restore social order, rule of law, stability, and basic security (Huntington)
 - ii. **Electoral incentives:** Holding early elections in divided societies heightens use of ethnic appeals by leaders seeking votes (Mansfield and Snyder)
 - iii. **Sequencing:** After state-building stage, then societies are ready for democratic elections

Focus on four explanations

1. Transition from autocracy and process of democratization?
 - (Mansfield and Snyder)
2. Or weak states: rule of law, corruption, and government effectiveness?
 - (Huntington)
3. Or grievances and lack of economic development
 - (Lipset, Collier)
4. Or spill-over effects from civil wars?

II. Concepts, evidence and research



Measure electoral violence

- National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA)
 - Susan Hyde and Nikolay Marinov, Yale University
- Classify 2,225 national legislative and presidential elections from 1960-2006
- Developing societies (non OECD) and independent nation-states
- Code electoral violence from a range of sources: e.g. Keesings, BBC, World Factbook, US State Dept, IFES, Economist, Lexis-Nexis, IPU, etc

Source: Nelda 1960-2006, Hyde and Marinov

<http://hyde.research.yale.edu/nelda/>


NELDA Measures

- **VIOLENCE:** Was there **significant violence involving civilian deaths** immediately before, during or after the election? Yes/No
 - If yes, did they involve allegations of vote fraud?
 - If yes, did the government use violence against demonstrators?
- **RIOTS:** Were there **riots and protests** after the election? Yes/No
- Measures standardized as a proportion of national elections held 1960-2006

Source: Nelda 1960-2006, Hyde and Marinov

<http://hyde.research.yale.edu/nelda/>

Distribution of the proportion of electoral violence and riots, 1960-2006



Source: Nelda 1960-2006, Hyde and Marinov

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
III. Results and analysis



1. Measure liberal democracy

- *The capacity of people to influence regime authorities within their nation-state*
- Freedom House: Freedom in the World index:
 - Political rights
 - Civil liberties
- 100-pt scale 1972 to 2010
- Historical experience of liberal democracy: summarized scale 1972-2010


By contemporary type of regime



Source: Nelda 1960-2006, Hyde and Marinov

<http://hyde.research.yale.edu/nelda/>


By historical experience of democracy



Source: Nelda 1960-2006, Hyde and Marinov

<http://hyde.research.yale.edu/nelda/>


Democracy and electoral violence



2. Measure governance

- *The capacity of regime authorities to perform functions essential for collective well-being.*
 - Weber: The capacity of the state to protect citizens living within its territory and to manage the delivery of public goods and services
- World Bank *Good Governance* index:
 - Government effectiveness;
 - Control of Corruption;
 - Law and Order.
- -2.5 to +2.5 scale 1996-2010
- Expert perception indices


Governance and violence



Source: Nelda 1960-2006, Hyde and Marinov

<http://hyde.research.yale.edu/nelda/>


3. By income level



Source: Nelda 1960-2006, Hyde and Marinov

<http://hyde.research.yale.edu/nelda/>


Human development...



Source: Nelda 1960-2006, Hyde and Marinov

<http://hyde.research.yale.edu/nelda/>

4. Internal Conflict



Source: Nelda 1960-2006, Hyde and Marinov

<http://hyde.research.yale.edu/nelda/>

IV. Conclusions and implications



Many other potential factors

- **Societal divisions**
 - Level of ethnic fractionalization, types of cleavages, levels of social inequality
- **Political institutions**
 - Majoritarian or power-sharing
 - E.g. type of electoral system, type of executive, federalism and decentralization
- **Geography**
 - Physical and population size, regional location, spill-over effects of neighboring states, role of natural resources

Most likely factors

- Hybrid regimes: Process of transition from autocracy and consolidation of democracy
 - Electoral autocracies, electoral democracies
- Economic development matters
- Countries experiencing civil war vulnerable to electoral violence

Policy implications?

- Do we need sequencing of elections in any regime transition?
- Specific policies to reduce electoral violence
 - Electoral dispute mechanisms established in advance (role of Electoral Management Bodies and Courts)
 - Electoral violence monitors (Ghana)
 - Pre-electoral agreement among parties
 - Commission to investigate problems (Kenya)

Qualifications

- Preliminary analysis; requires multivariate analysis with controls
- Broader project: examines impacts of democratic governance on prosperity, welfare and peace.
- Work in progress...more details:
www.pippanorris.com

Why Democratic Governance? Prosperity, Welfare and Peace

New York: Cambridge University Press New book forthcoming Aug 2012

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IV: Conclusions

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